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For the analysis of reality is possible only on the basis
of an appropriate access to what is real.
—Heidegger, Being and Time

When media theory and philosophy speak of machines in the context of science and
technology, they often focus on machines in reality. Machines are often treated as
being merely objectively present, as possible machines—something that might or might
not work. Yet, as this text will argue, the topos of the machine within European
history and theory of science and technology is located in a strange place that allows
the “impossible real” to become a “possible reality.” The machine complements that
which would otherwise be impossible to symbolize, calculate, or compute. It also
brings forth realities in which the impossible real continuously returns, in the form of
machines that freeze, break down, or disrupt the realities they are supposed to make
possible.1
Today, the machine is often addressed solely in terms of “computability.” So
far, nobody has ever built a Turing Machine that solved the halting problem. Yet, we
often speak of computers as if there were no limit to what they can compute (equating
them with Universal Turing Machines).2 Or we speak of computers as if the theoretical
limits that the Church-Turing thesis puts on any possible computer (its impossibility)
I equate “real” with “impossible” and “reality” with “possible.” I.e., in number theory, we cannot
identify the highest natural number, as there will always be a higher natural number. The “real,”
taken here as the impossibility of identifying the highest natural number, can certainly be
symbolized, formalized, and even calculated, i.e., as n+1 or […]. But by doing so, we always also
create some kind of left-over or surplus that in itself cannot be identified. Any formalization of the
real creates a surplus that escapes the formalization. Reality, in contrast, is something constantly
produced by subjects and machines, but only in terms of ideals or fiction. This reading of the
impossible-real and possible-reality is inspired by the function Heidegger ascribes to the structure
of Dasein and its forerunning towards the possibility of its own death—its own impossibility. This
structure only becomes apparent to Dasein when the inner-worldly structure of Zeug (tools,
equipment, machines, language…) breaks down. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation
of Sein Und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), part 1, ch. 3. For a detailed discussion of the
“impossible real” in Lacanian psychoanalysis, see Samo Tomšič, “Mathematical Realism and the
Impossible Structure of the Real,” Psychoanalytische Perspektiven 35, no. 1 (2017): 9–34. For a
discussion of the mathematical real in Lacan’s topology, see Michael Friedman, “Torus and
Identification: The Beginning of Lacanian Mathematics” in Psychoanalysis: Topological Perspectives:
New Conceptions of Geometry and Space in Freud and Lacan, ed. Michael Friedman and Samo Tomšič
(Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016), 153-190.
2
“So tritt zwischen Freud und Lacan der Computer, Alan Turings Universale Diskrete Maschine von
1936.” Friedrich A. Kittler, “Die Welt Des Symbolischen, Eine Welt Der Maschine,” in Draculas
Vermächtnis: Technische Schriften (Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1993), 65.
1
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do not matter in reality for the practical applications of computers, such as modeling
human cognition with trained neural networks.3
But the computationalist’s dream about unlimited possibilities of computing
the real belongs itself to a long history of European techno-rationality that can be
traced back to 17th-century figures like Descartes and Galileo. When revisiting the
origins of the European machinery (a term that alludes to both the historical
concatenations of technology and science in Europe and its former colonies as well as
the metahistorical truth and power structures that came along with it), one finds the
machine emerging at precisely the time and place in history where the gap between
mathematical-geometrical idealization and the reality of bodies and experiments first
appeared. Etymologically, the machine is rooted in theatrical mechanics of simulation,
illusion, and deception. Philosophically, it appears at the very cut between subjects
and objects, the “thinking” and the “mechanical” substances, the organic and nonorganic. The machine operates at the cut that separates and conjoins the inside world
(of psychology, cognition, or mind) and the outside world (of physics, biology, or
matter).
Since Aristotle, there has been a division of labor between those who work
with possibilities and those who work with impossibilities: the historian describes
what has happened (one of many possibilities), while the poet conveys what should
happen (in terms of fiction or impossibilities). One looks for something general to be
found in the particular, while the other one accounts for something universal only to
be found in the singular (something that is at the same time necessary, verisimilar,
and impossible to achieve).4 Historically and structurally, the European discourse on
machines, from its beginnings in the 17th century to its latest formulations in terms of
21st-century computationalism, belongs to both.5
When Christian universities started to study Aristotle’s De Anima in the 12th
century, they faced a dilemma: the soul in Aristotle was not just the seat of human
reason and will but also the principle of life in plants and animals. The soul was what
moved the body—any body. Accordingly, some technical objects of the Middle Ages,
such as clocks or church bells, wielded holy or diabolic powers. And because these
bodies were considered to have an individual persona and a soul (literally, as the
characteristic hollow recess that became animated each time a bell was intoned was
called “anima” or “soul”), they could even be tried in court, flogged, or banned from
Cf. Aaron Sloman, “The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to Artificial Intelligence,” in
Computationalism: New Directions, ed. Matthias Scheutz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 87–128.
4
Cf. Aristoteles, Poetik, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung 5, ed. and trans. Arbogast Schmitt (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 2008), pp. 13-14 [1451 b1-b5].
5
This is also why media theory should not be reduced to history or to literature and fiction.
3
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the city.6 Within the Christian doctrine, living bodies and technical objects were
supposed to be of the same substance. They were a metaphysical unit.
This changed with Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy, which stripped the
Aristotelian-scholastic soul from its vegetative parts and powers. He no longer needed
to assume a soul to move a body. In Discourse de la méthode, he grounds the l’âme
raisonnable, the rational soul, in human intelligence and passions, in faculties such as
language and wit, by distinguishing them from the automatic, repetitive,
programmable, machinic motions of clocks and automata.7
According to Hannah Arendt, the event that marked the Renaissance was the
telescope, or rather Galileo’s use of it. Technical objects mark events because, unlike
ideas that “come and go,” a technical object can be historically dated.8 It might be
more complicated, as we would have to add clockwork, which had already been
invented in the 13th century, and other mechanisms to this “event” because, for
Descartes, the machines that enabled him not only to rid the soul of its vital forces
but also to state a clear cut between animals and humans were machines that could
move themselves.9
With Renaissance automata also came mechanical simulation, theater,
illusion, and deception. The work of Salomon de Caus, a Huguenot engineer, and
architect, is of particular relevance here because his work on paper and in the form of
Cf. Daniel M. Zolli and Christopher Brown, “Bell on Trial: The Struggle for Sound after
Savonarola,” Renaissance Quarterly 72, no. 1 (2019): 54–96, 6.
7
Cf. René Descartes, Von der Methode des richtigen Vernunftgebrauchs und der wissenschaftlichen
Forschung, ed. and trans. Lüder Gäbe, Philosophische Bibliothek 261 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), 96.
8
“In the realm of ideas there is only originality and depth […] but no absolute, objective novelty; ideas
come and go, they have a permanence, even an immortality of their own, depending upon their
inherent power of illumination […] Ideas, moreover, are distinguished from events, are never
unprecedented, and empirically unconfirmed speculations about the earth’s movement around the
sun were no more unprecedented than contemporary theories about atoms would be if they had no
basis in experiments and no consequences in the factual world.” Hannah Arendt, The Human
Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 259.
9
On the role automata played within the Christian-scholastic context, see Christina Vagt, “Deus in
Machina: Zur Sakralisierung der Mechanik im späten Mittelalter,” in Medien des Heiligen, ed.
Friedrich Balke, Bernhard Siegert, and Joseph Vogl, Archiv für Mediengeschichte (Paderborn:
Wilhelm Fink, 2015), 31–42. Descartes is not completely coherent in his usage of the term “soul,”
though that should not be understood as contradictory: “When confronting his opponents,
Descartes will insist that animals do not have souls, if by ‘soul’ is meant what the Aristotelian
means. On the other hand, he will say: you may, if you wish, continue using the word ‘soul’ of
something in animals—but then you must consider that the soul is only the blood, or the heat of
the heart, and nothing more. Though philosophers occasionally misunderstand the tactic, and take
Descartes to have contradicted himself, in context there is no confusion.” Dennis Des Chene, Spirits
and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 67.
6
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built machines was well known by Descartes and his contemporaries.10 De Caus
designed the famous garden of the Palatinate in Heidelberg, where some of the
stunning automata and water plays are still on display today.11 These were machines
in the modern sense because not only did they appear to be self-moving, but they also
were able to simulate the movements of animals.
During the Middle Ages, machines were without a mechanism: the term
“machina” was solely used to signify stable wooden constructions to reach inaccessible
places; they were just scaffolds (Gestell). Simple mechanisms like pulleys and levers or
more elaborate ones like mills were quite common, but they were not called
“machines.” Not until the 16th century did “machina” and “mechanae” merge into the
modern concept of “machine,” at which point the mechanism began to function as the
model for cause and effect, and the many members of the machine created the
appearance, simulation, or illusion.12 From them on, the machine also signifies the
difference between the inside and the outside world, between a hidden interior
mechanism and the exterior effects it produces.13
This is crucial to understand how machines started to make the impossible
possible. The “real” of the machine is this difference between interior mechanism and
causality and its exterior appearance and materialization. To fulfill this function, it
was not important that a particular machine design was actually operational and built.
In fact, the most elaborate machine designs of de Caus were just that: designs,
drawings, and mathematical calculations on paper that were never built and that
could never have been built according to today’s mechanical standards. But that didn’t
matter—because the machine demonstrated possibility. “De Caus’ machines could or
could not work, and that is all that was asked of them.”14
The exterior of a calculated, precise, rational machine is crucial for
understanding the coming of modern science. Only by means of the machine could
modern science surmount the gap that had separated physics from mathematics ever
On the role of de Caus in Descartes’ Traîte de l’homme and Discours de la méthode, see Des Chene,
Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes., 65ff.
11
https://www.schloss-heidelberg.de/wissenswert-amuesant/persoenlichkeiten/salomon-de-caus
[visited June 12th, 2022].
12
Cf. Vagt, “Deus in Machina: Zur Sakralisierung der Mechanik im späten Mittelalter,” 89-90.
13
I learned this from Michael Dengler’s dissertation on “Pius machines.” Michael Dengler,
“Zeitmaschinen, Sakralautomaten, Frömmigkeitsapparate: Die Produktion sakraler Zeiten im
Kirchenraum der Vormoderne” (PhD diss., University of Konstanz, 2011), 24, http://nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-263349.
14
My translation from Dennis Des Chene, “Imaginierte Maschinen und die wirkliche Welt,” in Spuren
der Avantgarde: Theatrum Anatomicum: Frühe Neuzeit und Moderne Im Kulturvergleich, ed. Helmar
Schramm and Ludger Schwarte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 136.
10
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since the inventions of Babylonian astronomy and Greek geometry. Before the
Renaissance, sensory observation of (terrestrial) objects was not conceived of as
something that could or should be described in terms of rigid, precise mathematical
figures and laws.
When Galileo formulated his law of inertia, he did so by supposing a
movement along a straight line. Yet, this straight line is based on neither experimental
observation nor a retrospective reconstruction of experience. Instead, it asserts
something that is strictly speaking impossible ever to realize.15 Ergo, the real is
explained by the impossible.16
According to Koyré, Renaissance science transferred the mathematics of
astronomy to terrestrial physics, not according to, but against appearance and reason:
“Physics is not applied geometry. Terrestrial matter can never exhibit exact
mathematical figures; the ‘forms’ never ‘in-form’ it completely and perfectly. There
always remains a gap. In the skies, of course, it is different; and therefore,
mathematical astronomy is possible. But astronomy is not physics.”17
Bodies on earth never move in straight lines or perfect circles because gravity
always interferes. What was possible in astronomy—to describe the movement of
bodies in rigid, regular, and precise mathematics—was impossible on earth: “These
bodies moving in straight lines in infinite empty space are not real bodies moving in
real space, but mathematical bodies moving in mathematical space.”18

«Contrairement à ce qu’on affirme bien souvent, la loi d’inertie n’a pas son origine dans l’expérience
du sens commun et n’est ni une généralisation de cette expérience, ni même son idéalisation. Ce
que l’on trouve dans l’expérience, c’est le mouvement circulaire ou, plus généralement, le
mouvement curviligne. On n’est jamais — sauf le cas exceptionnel de la chute, qui n’est justement
pas un mouvement inertial — en présence d’un mouvement rectiligne. Et c’est pourtant le premier
— le mouvement curviligne — que la physique classique va s’efforcer d’expliquer à partir du
dernier. Curieuse démarche de la pensée, dans laquelle il ne s’agit pas d’expliquer le donné
phénoménal par la supposition d’une réalité sous-jacente (ainsi que le fait l’astronomie, qui
explique les phénomènes, c’est-à-dire les mouvements apparents, par une combinaison de
mouvements réels), ni même d’analyser ce donné en ses éléments simples pour l’en reconstruire
après coup (méthode résolutive et compositive, à laquelle — à tort à notre avis —, on réduit le
nouveau de la méthode galiléenne); il s’agit, à proprement parler, d’expliquer ce qui est à partir de
ce qui n'est pas, de ce qui n’est jamais. Et même à partir de ce qui ne peut jamais être. » Alexandre
Koyré, Etudes Galiléennes (Paris: Hermann, 1966), 206.
16
Cf. Alexandre Koyré, Etudes Galiléennes (Paris: Hermann, 1966), 207.
17
Alexandre Koyré, “Galileo and Plato,” Journal of the History of Ideas 4, no. 4 (October 1943): 422. For a
detailed discussion of the “impossible real” in the writings of Koyré and Lacan, science and
psychoanalysis, see Tomšič, “Mathematical Realism and the Impossible Structure of the Real.”
18
Koyré, “Galileo and Plato”, 419 (emphasis in original).
15
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For mathematical physics to arrive on earth, it was crucial to fill the gap
between the actual, experienced movements of bodies and the geometricalmathematical ideals derived from astronomy. Here, the machine is not just of
historical relevance but of structural and epistemological importance when assigning
physical reality to mathematical objects—because it allows the creation of an exterior
to a theoretical interior. Before the Renaissance, mathematical objects such as
geometric diagrams were not supposed to represent anything; they were simply eternal,
ideal forms, just like the planets. For an empiricist such as Aristotle, any attempt “to
explain the real by the impossible” would have seemed absurd. But the Renaissance
world was becoming familiar with a type of material body that—unlike Galileo’s
counterfactual thought experiments with objects falling from the Leaning Tower of
Pisa—behaves in regular and foreseeable ways: clocks and automata. Therefore, the
objects that made modern mathematical science possible did not just stem from ideal
mathematics but from the reality created by mechanics. After all, the production of
precise scientific instruments, such as optical lenses for telescopes and then
microscopes, required the construction of precise machines, like the machine designed
by Descartes to manufacture parabolic lenses.19
Koyré’s take on the abyss that separated Greek mathematics and astronomy
from modern mathematical physics found its echoes across European theorists such
as Kojève, Lacan, Heidegger, and Arendt. Henceforth, the order of succession between
science and technology was reversed because from then on, the machine cannot simply
be taken as a product or instrument of science; rather, it seems to function as its
complement; one cannot operate without the other.
The machine was necessary for a science that forces terrestrial bodies into
regular and precise geometrical-mathematical patterns, yet the supposed “real” it
prescribes never appears in such regularity and precision outside of the machine. The
machine, in this sense, writes something impossible and necessary—it has a poetic
function because it writes what should happen. Machines could now serve as models

19

«Car, pour faire les appareils optiques il faut non seulement améliorer la qualité des verres que l’on
emploie et en déterminer—c’est-à-dire mesurer d’abord et calculer ensuite—les angles de
réfraction, il faut encore améliorer leurs taille, c’est-à-dire savoir leur donner une forme précise,
une forme géométrique exactement définie: et pour ce faire, il faut construire des machines de plus
en plus précises, des machine mathématiques qui, autant que les instruments eux-même,
présupposent la substitution, dans l’esprit de leurs inventeurs, de l’univers de précision au monde
de l’à-peu-près. Aussi n’est-ce nullement par hasard que le premier instrument optique a été
inventé par Galilée et la première machine moderne - machine à tailler des verres paraboliques—
par Descartes. » Alexandre Koyré, Études d’histoire de La Pensée Scientifique (Paris: Gallimard, 1973),
353.
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for everything that moves on and beyond earth, as well as for the scientific method—
rationality—as such.
Yet, the impossible real has kept haunting the possible worlds of modern
science ever since. As Leibniz already noted, there seem to be bodies that resist
calculation. These “living machines” require an infinite set of operations, both in their
bodies and their souls. When he visited Den Haag in 1676, he met the gifted lensgrinder Baruch Spinoza and the equally gifted microscope builder Leeuwenhoek.20
With its theory of folded matter, Leibniz's metaphysics would be called bio-inspired
because it was inspired by the microorganisms Leeuwenhoek showed him under the
microscope. Leibniz started out as a Cartesian, but after seeing the microorganisms
in Leeuwenhoek’s microscope, he took the metaphysics of machines one step further:
In his Monadology from 1715, he describes the soul as an immaterial monad, an
automated or self-acting capacity to execute a code.21
Today, we tend to treat a law inscribed in the soul like a computer program
as an algorithm. Yet, a computer does not have to interpret; its activity is divided into
an exact number of predefined steps that have to be performed one after the other.
Leibniz's division of living infinite machines and man-made finite machines reduces
the problem of impossibility to the question of calculability.
This leads back to the beginning of this text and the observation that media
theory and philosophy often speak of machines as merely objectively present in terms
of the possible. Instead, a media theory of possible-impossible machines would have
to take the logical and mathematical impossibilities of machines into account. Part of
this work would pertain to the history of the failures, breakdowns, errors, and
mishaps, as well as the death-by-machine that made the modern world by sheer
missionary and colonizing zest. The other part would have to ask about the fantasy of
the machine, its necessary impossibilities, whose structure we can only find by
attempting to write that which continuously fails to be mechanized, calculated,
described, or addressed by means of machines. It would have to deal with the
difference between a scientific theory and its machinic exterior, a gap that keeps
reappearing between that which can be written in logic, topology, or fiction but which
cannot be computed.

Cf. Alessandro Becchi, “Between Learned Science and Technical Knowledge: Leibniz, Leeuwenhoek
and the School for Microscopists,” in Tercentenary Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Leibniz, ed.
Lloyd Strickland, Erik Vynckier, and Julia Weckend (Cham: Springer International Publishing,
2017), 47-79.
21
Cf. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadologie (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1714), paragraph no. 64.
20

communication+1 Vol. 9 [2022], Iss. 1, Article 7
7

Vagt / Impossible Possible Machines

I would like to thank Robert Tate Groome and the members of the Logic Set Topology cartel at
P.L.A.C.E. in Santa Monica for our discussions and their work on related matters.
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